




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# China clean energy innovation and the global clean energy transition

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## Presentation outline: key factors in China's clean energy revolution

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- 'Socialist market economy' with a weak central state
- Policy: industrial policy, including subsidies, targets, and resources for favoured industry
- Human capital: workforce, scientists, and links to international expertise
- Entrepreneurship, including in partnership with the state
- Match between technology characteristics and China's (manufacturing-led) economic structure, built around domestic geographic supply chain clusters



# Contrast between Washington Consensus and China model

## Washington Consensus or Western Model

- Technology neutral (don't pick winners); focus on 'level playing field' and consumer benefit
- Price externalities; enable the market to decide – both ST (consumers, power sector dispatch) and LT (investment)
- Fund R&D to ensure technology leadership (the 'Entrepreneurial State'), scale up and commercialize via the private sector (capital markets)
- Free trade that benefits consumers and industry, enabling dominance of 'high-value' sectors and offshoring 'commodity manufacturing'





# Contrast between Washington Consensus and China model



## China model

- State identifies strategic emerging industries, and channels capital and resources to firms and entrepreneurs in those fields
- Market mechanisms (carbon pricing, power markets) exist to guide ST firm behaviour based on best practices, not intended to price externalities or guide investment
- Local governments actively intervene to promote economic specialization, supply-chain integration / scale up, local hyper-competition
- Trade is managed to encourage or require localization and ‘mastery’ of whole supply chain



# How China stacks up as a clean technology innovation system (TIS)

## Critical enabling factors for technology innovation systems (Hekkert 2007; Bergek 2008)

- |                                      |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| <b>1. Entrepreneurial activities</b> | High in disruptive techs, powerful incumbents  |
| <b>2. Knowledge development</b>      | R&D spending, patenting, workforce   |
| <b>3. Knowledge networks</b>         | Access to global knowledge, supply chain linkages  |
| <b>4. Guidance of search</b>         | FYP, SEI designation, targets, R&D catalogs  |
| <b>5. Market formation</b>           | Capital investment bias, market barriers   |
| <b>6. Resource mobilization</b>      | High: SOE soft budget constraint, POE low CoC  |
| <b>7. Legitimacy</b>                 | Success in strategic emerging industries,<br>confidence in policy stability, carbon policy since<br>2020 |



# China's Clean Energy Take-off: Role of Policy




Wind power

- Long-term policies: renewable law, renewable obligation, CDM local content requirement
- Subsidies: FIT
- Targets: FYPs, NDC, technology catalogues



PV



Batteries

- Long-term policies: local content requirements for EV subsidies
- Subsidies: low-cost loans



EVs

- Long-term policies: NEV mandate, local policies, SEI
- Subsidies: tax, purchase subsidy
- Targets: 2025, 2027, and 2030



## How did technology transfer happen so fast?


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- Wind: Clean Development Mechanism, local content requirements, JVs and partnerships
- PV: Turnkey production lines, acquisition of defunct solar startups
- Batteries: Turnkey production lines, local content requirements, licensing and patent acquisitions
- EVs: JV requirements, FDI (BYD, Tesla)



# Technology characteristics and the nature of tech diffusion

- Clean energy technologies are relatively manufacturing intensive
- Speed of scale-up depends on manufacturing knowhow, size of market
- Turnkey production lines result in lower barriers to entry
- Global knowledge base assists tech transfer
- Vertical integration accelerates learning-by-doing, by enabling interactions among suppliers




SCHMIDT & HUENTELER (2016)




# Domestic demand is key to China's scale-up (1)

## China PV capacity, 2015 to 2025, in GW



## China wind capacity, 2015 to 2025, in GW




Source: OIES, based on NEA data




# Domestic demand is key to China's scale-up (2)

### China grid-scale battery capacity, 2021 to 2025



Source: OIES, based on CNESA data

### China Domestic NEV sales, NEV % market share



Source: OIES, based on CAAM data



# How do pilot programmes actually work in China?

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
- Pilots are often cited as a hallmark of China's economic development strategy
- Advantages:
  - Experimentation
  - Motivation for local officials
  - Target resources
- Disadvantages
  - Duplication
  - Overcapacity / value-destructive bankruptcies
- EV case shows pilot strategy at its best
  - NEV pilot provinces selected by political-economic criteria: (1) car manufacturing, (2) existing EV policies, (3) infrastructure
  - Subsidies targeted to best provinces, and withheld if province didn't meet own targets (EV adoption, infrastructure)
  - Synergy with content requirement and FDI
- Shenzhen, Beijing, and Shanghai show that many paths were available to high EV penetration



# Big role for vertical integration and industrial clusters

- Encouraged by local government
- Intense competition within each cluster, especially among suppliers
- Co-evolution of technology
- Entrepreneurs see benefits of vertical integration and clustering
  - Trina
  - CATL
  - BYD
- Critical to speed and scale-up

## Battery and EV manufacturing clusters, 2021





Source: Boy Lüthje et al., 'China's New Energy Vehicle Battery Industry', 2021



# Intellectual capital, workforce composition critical enablers

- Science and technology focus encouraged since Reform and Opening
- Support for top universities, emphasis on technical fields
- Recruitment of returning scholars, entrepreneurs
  - Encouragement of study abroad
- Massive increase in R&D spending – now 2.8% GDP
- Incentives for patent filings, scientific publications






# Shift in manufacturing and demand → shift in high value too

## Example of solar industry

- 2011 Alan Goodrich (NREL) paper: U.S. benefits from solar PV trade with China, maintains lead in highest-value tools
- March 2017 Jeffrey Ball New Solar System report: China now producing high-end tools, albeit with lower quality
- 2022 IEA report (Special Report on Solar PV Global Supply Chains): China now dominates global manufacturing of high-end solar manufacturing tools

## US-China solar trade balance, 2011



Source: Alan Goodrich et al., National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2011



# Startups and entrepreneurs central to China new energy industry



Trina

- Founder: Jifan Gao
- Founded 1997, Changzhou, Jiangsu
- Founder background: Detergent, energy-efficient building materials



Yingli

- Founder: Liansheng Miao
- Founded 1998, Baoding, Hebei
- Founder background: Cosmetics, water purification



Jinko

- Founder: Xiande Li
- Founded 2006, Shangrao, Jiangxi
- Founder background: Firefighting equipment



LDK

- Founder: Xiaofeng Peng
- Founded 2004, Nanjing, Jiangsu
- Founder background: Chemical protective clothing



## Startup leaders focused on manufacturing



### BYD

- Wang Chuanfu
- Company origins in contract manufacturing for Nokia, Eriksson
- Focused on mastering all aspects of electronics



### Geely

- Li Shufu
- Founded Geely in 1990s
- Ambition to beat European companies on quality – ended up acquiring Volvo



### CATL

- Robin Zeng
- Initially founded ATL in 1999, sold to LDK for \$100m in 2005
- CATL initially focused on electronics



## Scale-up strategy depends on securing resources & innovation

- 2000s: US solar industry focused on thin films, Europe on high-efficiency c-Si; China on conventional C-Si
- Early 2010s: US & Japanese EV exploration focused on Li-NMC battery, Li-NCA; China licenses LFP technology
- By 2022, LFP accounted for 65% of China NEV market, up from 30% in 2019
- Process repeating for Na-ion (Chang-an / CATL winter testing shown at right)





## Chinese firms following familiar pattern abroad

- Localizing human resources and supply chains viewed as a positive for efficiency and scale-up
- CATL has battery plants in Germany and Hungary
- In Dec 2024, Stellantis and CATL announced will invest Euro 4.1 billion in new LFP battery plant in Spain
- Mid-2024 CATL launched Euro 1.5 billion fund for building out European supply chains

### CATL prepares 1.5 billion fund to secure battery supply chain

CATL has initiated discussions with various sovereign funds and automobile manufacturers, such as Mercedes-Benz, to invite them to participate in this new financial tool, aimed at increasing its presence in Europe and other international markets.





# Policy makers clearly concerned at ease of technology diffusion

New battery technology export restrictions announced October 2025:

Lithium-ion battery manufacturing:

- Winding machines, stacking machines, electrolyte-injection machines, hot presses, formation and grading systems, capacity sorting cabinets

Cathode materials and manufacturing:

- Roller kilns, high-speed mixers, sand mills, air flow mills

Graphite anode materials and manufacturing:

- Granulation process, continuous graphitization technology liquid-phase coating technology

South China Morning Post

## China unleashes battery export controls as it makes strides in solid-state science


Analysts say the measures are meant to consolidate China's advantage in the lithium battery industry and slow the progress of competitors

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# Will these strategies help the *world's* green energy transition?

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## Optimistic:

- Manufacturing intensive fields have lower barriers to entry
- Tacit knowledge sharing and learning-by-doing are difficult, but easier than new IP
- Chinese companies establishing technology clusters outside of China
- Many of the same policy tools employed by China are available, but effectiveness in doubt

## Pessimistic:

- Advanced economies suffer from greater technology lock-in, especially when incumbent energy and manufacturing companies take the lead in managing the transition
- Developing world countries may lack skilled workforce, technology base in related industries, necessary to catch up



# Industrial policy literature: old and recent findings

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## Old knowledge

- While comparative advantage benefits consumers in the ST, leads to a passive approach by governments, little interest in guiding development
- National Innovation Networks and Intellectual Capital position countries for future
- Protective tariffs lead to higher costs for consumers but stifle future industries – they lock in older technologies and infrastructure

## Newer thinking

- U.S. and other countries recognize that R&D expertise does not translate to manufacturing knowhow, and shift of manufacturing leads to higher-value industries shifting as well
- Demand-pull policies serve as ‘guidance of search’ for industry and knowledge networks
- General purpose technologies and manufacturing technologies may require more engineering and management knowledge than top scientific talent – makes catch-up easier and means industrial transition longer, giving government ability to prepare



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