Centralisation, state intervention and the redistribution of power in energy markets

Oxford Energy Network 20 February 2024

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Low emission electricity



Marine carbon removal




Urban carbon removal

Against the narrative of decentralisation

Energy Volume 262, Part B, 1 January 2023, 125521

Digitalization in decarbonizing electricity systems – Phenomena, regional aspects, stakeholders, use cases, challenges and policy options

<u>Fabian Heymann</u>^a \boxtimes , <u>Tatjana Milojevic</u>^b \land \boxtimes , <u>Andrei Covatariu</u>^d \boxtimes , <u>Piyush Verma</u>^c \boxtimes





Historical, policy and institutional analysis

Interviews to document networks of influence

Tracing decisions making and regulatory choices

The Argument

Low carbon technology financial needs

High uncertainty over technology coupling

New expectation of public accountability







First. UK history

Energy Research & Social Science 94 (2022) 102882



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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/erss

Original research article

In plain sight: The rise of state coordination and fall of liberalised markets in the United Kingdom power sector




ENERGY

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


Fig. 3. Analytical description of the institutional evolution in the UK. <u>CEA</u>: Central Electricity Authority; <u>CEGB</u>: Central Electricity Generating Board; <u>DTI</u>: Department of Trade and Industry; <u>DE</u>: Department of Energy; <u>DECC</u>: Department of Energy and Climate Change; <u>CCC</u>: Climate Change Committee; <u>BEIS</u>: Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; Low Carbon Contract Company; <u>Offer</u>: Office of Electricity Regulation; <u>Ofgem</u>: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets; <u>NG</u>: National Grid; <u>ESO</u>: Electricity System Operator; <u>FSO</u>: Future System Operator; <u>NG</u>: National Grid.

Low Carbon Contract Company



Elexon

Energy System Operator / Future Systems Operator


Dimension	Re-regulation	State coordination		
Role of the state	Assertive regulators steer private operators	State agencies take operational decisions		
Governance tools	Differentiate regulation across market segments	Public mission agencies are in charge		
Political objective	Efficient capital allocation and acceptable retail prices	Lowering capital cost and de- risking investment		
UK Instruments	 Price Control Regulated asset-based remuneration Segmentation of markets (ie. REMA) 	 CfD area planning Future Energy Scenarios Offshore Coordination mechanisms 		
UK actors	BEIS; Ofgem	BEIS; SO, LCCC, Crown Estates		

The importance of the SO

		Ownership				
			Pubic		Privat	e
Location of system operator	Integrated	1 Mexico Pre-reform	1 Chile Pre-reform	1 UK Pre-reform		
	Transmission				2 Chile Liberalization	2 UK Liberalization
	Independent	2 Mexico Reform	3 Chile Reforms (2016)	4 Future Systems Operator		3 UK License change (2017)


Why is this important?


Classical depiction of regulatory relations



SO integrated to transmission company

SO independent from the transmission company





Legend G: Governor R: Market regulator T: Taget industries SO:System operator

New interventionism: the re-politicisation of electricity governance with renewable energy policies in the UK, Mexico and Morocco

Recto running head : JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY

Verso running head : E. MATHIEU AND J. M. VALENZUELA

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Forthcoming in the Journal of European Public Policy




Table 2. Evolution of interventionism in electricity policy by policy instruments (UK)

	Policy instrument			
Intervention instrument	Wholesale market (1989-)	RE Quotas (2000-2010)	RE FiT (2000-)	RE Auctions (CfD) (2013-)
Type of industrial	Drivete	Drivete	Drivete	Private
actors	Private	Private	Private	SOEs
Number of regulated issues	0	2 Volume Technology	2 Technology Price	5 Volume Technology Location Off-taker Local integration
Regulatory governance	IRA	IRA	IRA	Ministry

Note: darker cells correspond to more interventionism

	Policy instrument				
Intervention instrument	Single buyer (1992-2014)	RE Wheeling subsidy (2008-2015)	Market (2014-)	RE Certificate Obligations (2015-)	RE Auctions (2015-)
Type of industrial actor	SOE	Drivete	SOE	Private	SOEs
	Private	Private	Private	SOE	Private
Number of regulated issues	4 Volume, Technology Location Off-taker	1 Price	1 Off-taker	1 Volume	3 Volume Location Off-taker
Regulatory governance	Ministry IRA	IRA	IRA	Ministry	Ministry

 Table 3. Evolution of interventionism in electricity policy by policy instruments (Mexico)

Note: darker cells correspond to more interventionism

Marginalisation of Regulators

Auctions governance in the UK

2013 UK Energy Act

Auctions to allocate contracts for difference (CfD)

Focus on nuclear

Re-distributive policy

Ministry (DECC) high profile

Ofgem (IRA) criticized within Parliament

2023 Grid & RE coordination

Need to coordinate grid and RE expansion

Ofgem called to be the 'system architect' Ofgem rejects!

Ofgem searching to bolster its legitimacy

Conflicts with its consumer-oriented mandate

Delegation to system operator, change Ofgem mandate

Mexico

Jan. 8, 2021, 3:45 PM GMT

Mexico Could Scrap Antitrust and Energy Regulators, AMLO Says

Bloomberg News

Turbulent times for energy governance.

Opportunities for creative re-imagination of energy institutions.

Thank you.

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